30
CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO
Before such a system, therefore, becomes apparent, I consider it most expedient for us to concentrate our force at Chinhae. As to eventually (permanently) retaining Ningpo, it would be a clog to us, even were it prudent to contemplate the measure. The question then is, what is the best course to pursue on evacuating the place? A settlement of the Chinese question can only be obtained by the Emperor's acceding to the terms proposed by the British Government; by the overthrow of the present Chinese dynasty; or by the expulsion of the British naval and military force; this latter case no Englishman can contemplate; in viewing the other two, it must be borne in mind that there is as much a prospective as an immediate object to be gained, and I think that the spirit of Lord Auckland's very luminous despatch of the 10th of May points out the great importance of encouraging a friendly feeling with a view to future commercial intercourse; his Lordship, it is true, applies this principle to the provinces of Canton and Fokien, but I feel confident that, were his Lordship in possession of facts connected with our present position, he would desire to apply it equally to this province, and possibly to the whole of China.
The idea of pressing the Chinese Government through the medium of the people, has in my opinion proved fallacious; the whole system of Chinese policy shows that whatever may be the feelings of the Emperor towards his subjects, the Mandarins and all the Government officers are indifferent to their welfare, further than suits their own purposes; and I believe that you would inflict no greater annoyance upon the Chinese Government than by opening the eyes of the people to the fact, that the British character has been foully belied, and that we are not only a brave, but a just and honourable nation. It is therefore, I confess, my most anxious wish not to seize the private property, whether placed in shop, who has remained upon the spot. It must be remembered that Ningpo offered no opposition; that the inhabitants threw themselves on our protection, or pretended to do so; and that a number of Ningpo men have been taken up as traitors to their own country, merely because their townsmen held friendly intercourse with the British. I would, therefore, having now remained six weeks amongst them without the occurrence of a single act of oppression on our part, seek to leave a strong impression of our forbearance, our moderation, and our justice; and I am confident that by our alone seizing or destroying Government property, and taking a duty of 10 per cent, on all imports and exports, except from places in our own possession, that desirable object would be effected.
In this point of view, it appears to me, that the course above-mentioned would be the most judicious policy; and, considering also the importance laid on the expeditious proceeding to the Peiho next spring, I would suggest the expediency of husbanding the troops as well as the naval force this winter as much as possible, to prepare them for the ensuing campaign to the northward. By this time, in all probability, 800 recruits from England have arrived at Hong-Kong, and I would therefore beg leave to suggest that the "Jupiter" be sent down as soon as practicable, to bring up the 26th regiment from Hong-Kong and Amoy. I will instruct Major-general Burrell to retain the recruits of the 49th and 55th regiments, amounting to 520 men, to replace the wing of the 26th, and to send on the recruits of the 18th (160), with any recovered men belonging to the five companies of that corps at Amoy, to that station, to replace there the detachments of the 26th (150) under Major Johnstone; this will give us by the end of January at farthest, a reinforcement of about 600 well-drilled acclimatized men, which, with the force that I can collect during the winter at Chinhae, will enable us to proceed at the very first change of the monsoon to the entrance of the Gulf of Pechelee, and take up some defensible position where the reinforcements from India could join us, on the Shou-tung promontory, say at Tin-teh-ro-foo, or one of the Minatan Islands, or possibly on one of the islands higher up the Gulf.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA.
- No. 22.-
260
31
EXTRACT of a LETTER from Rear-Admiral Sir William Parker to Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough, dated 2 December 1841. WHENEVER the troops remove to Chinghae, I propose to place a sufficient Sir William Parker force of the squadron to support the garrison, and to employ the remainder at Chusan, or where they may be most required, with a view to the public service, and our expected operations next season.
Before your Excellency's letter reached me, I had made preparatory arrangements for despatching the "Jupiter" to Hong-Kong to receive the troops from the transports, "Carnatic," "Earl of Hardwick" and "Tartar," having been informed by the Plenipotentiary that they will be on heavy demurrage if the men are not removed as soon as they arrive. She will be ready to sail shortly; and I will take care to instruct Mr. Fulton to embark and bring up the men, agreeably to the details you have transmitted, or any alteration you may devise.
I seriously hope that further reinforcements will arrive to enable us to go to the northward as early as possible next year. But I much doubt whether it will be advisable to proceed until the main body is assembled, for reasons which I will explain when I have the pleasure of seeing you.
- No. 23,-
EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from Lord Stanley to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
Downing-street, 4 February 1842.
No. 23.
I ASSUME, that the operations of 1841 will have been limited to the successful Lord Stanley to the attack upon Amoy, the occupation of Kulungsu, and the re-occupation of the Lords Commissioners Island of Chusan.
of the 4 February 1842. Admiralty,
I assume, that the forces available for 1842 will be an army of 9,000 to 10,000 men, of which there will be five British regiments, amounting to about 4,000 men, and a company of British Artillery, combined with a naval force of three ships of the line, and a fleet, including thirteen or fourteen steamers, of about forty sail.
It will, of course, be necessary to provide for the maintenance of Hong-Kong, of the Island of Kulungsu, and of Chusan. The remainder of the force, naval and military, will be available for such operations as it may be deemed most advisable to undertake, with a view of producing such an impression on the court of Pekin, as to lead to a speedy compliance with the terms which Sir Henry Pottinger is instructed to require.
-No. 24.-
COPY of a LETTER from the Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough to Lord Stanley. (Received 5th May.) My Lord,
Fort William, 18 March 1842.
No. 24. IMMEDIATELY after my arrival at this Presidency, I judged it necessary to Lord Ellenborough address letters to the Commander-in-Chief of the land and sea forces of Her to Lord Stanley, Majesty in China, detailing for their Excellencies' information, the extent of the military and naval strength to be placed at their disposal for the campaign of the year 1842, and explaining the measures taken by the Government of India for sending further reinforcements of native troops to China. In these letters, copies of which are enclosed, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, I have communicated to the Military and Naval Commanders-in-Chief the manner in which the forces under their command are to be employed.
It occurred to me as not impossible that no instructions will have been sent from China to Singapore to the address of Lord Saltoun, commanding the reinforcements on their way from England, to await his Lordship's arrival at that port, and I have therefore addressed a letter to that officer, a copy of which
596.
D 4
is
30
CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO
Before such a system, therefore, becomes apparent, I consider it most expedient for us to concentrate our force at Chinhae. As to eventually (permanently) retaining Ningpo, it would be a clog to us, even were it prudent to contemplate the measure. The question then is, what is the best course to pursue on evacuating the place?" A settlement of the Chinese question can only be obtained by the Emperor's acceding to the terms proposed by the British Government; by the overthrow of the present Chinese dynasty; or by the expulsion of the British naval and military force; this latter case no Englishman can contemplate; in viewing the other two, it must be borne in mind that there is as much a pro- spective as an immediate object to be gained, and I think that the spirit of Lord Auckland's very luminous despatch of the 10th of May points out the great im- portance of encouraging a friendly feeling with a view to future commercial intercourse; his Lordship, it is true, applies this principle to the provinces of Canton and Fokien, but I feel confident that, were his Lordship in possession of facts connected with our present position, he would desire to apply it equally to this province, and possibly to the whole of China. The idea of pressing the Chinese Government through the medium of the people, has in my opinion proved fallacious; the whole system of Chinese policy shows that whatever may be the feelings of the Emperor towards his subjects, the Mandarins and all the Government officers are indifferent to their welfare, further than suits their own purposes; and I believe that you would inflict no greater annoyance upon the Chinese Government than by opening the eyes of the people to the fact, that the British character has been foully belied, and that we are not only a brave, but a just and honourable nation. It is therefore, I confess, my most anxious wish not to seize the private property, whether placed in shop, who has remained upon the spot. It must be remembered that Ningpo offered no opposition; that the inhabitants threw themselves on our protection, or pretended to do so; and that a number of Ningpo men have been taken up as traitors to their own country, merely because their townsmen held friendly intercourse with the British. I would, therefore, having now remained six weeks amongst them without the occurrence of a single act of oppression on our part, seek to leave a strong impression of our forbearance, our moderation, and our justice; and I am confident that by our alone seizing or destroying Government property, and taking a duty of 10 per cent, on all imports and exports, except from places in our own possession, that desirable object would be effected.
In this point of view, it appears to me, that the course above-mentioned would be the most judicious policy; and, considering also the importance laid on the expeditious proceeding to the Peiho next spring, I would suggest the expe- diency of husbanding the troops as well as the naval force this winter as much as possible, to prepare them for the ensuing campaign to the northward. By this time, in all probability, 800 recruits from England have arrived at Hong-Kong, and 1 would therefore beg leave to suggest that the "Jupiter" be sent down as soon as practicable, to bring up the 26th regiment from Hong-Kong and Amoy. I will instruct Major-general Burrell to retain the recruits of the 49th and 55th regiments, amounting to 520 men, to replace the wing of the 26th, and to send on the recruits of the 18th (160), with any recovered men belonging to the five companies of that corps at Amoy, to that station, to replace there the detachments of the 26th (150) under Major Johnstone; this will give us by the end of January at farthest, a reinforcement of about 600 well-drilled acclimatized men, which, with the force that I can collect during the winter at Chinhae, will enable us to proceed at the very first change of the monsoon to the entrance of the Gulph of Pechele, and take up some defensible position where the reinforcements from India could join us, on the Shou-tung promontory, say at Tin-tehro-foo, or one of the Minatan Islands, or possibly on one of the islands higher up the Gulph.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA.
- No. 22.-
260
31
EXTRACT of a LETTER from Rear-Admiral Sir William Parker to Lieutenant- General Sir Hugh Gough, dated 2 December 1841. WHENEVER the troops remove to Chinghae, I propose to place a sufficient Sir William Parker
No. 22. force of the squadron to support the garrison, and to employ the remainder at to Sir Hugh Goughb, Chusan, or where they may be most required, with a view to the public service, 2 December 1841. and our expected operations next season.
Before your Excellency's letter reached me, I had made preparatory arrange- ments for despatching the "Jupiter" to Hong-Kong to receive the troops from the transports, "Carnatic," "Earl of Hardwick" and "Tartar," having been informed by the Plenipotentiary that they will be on heavy demurrage if the men are not removed as soon as they arrive. She will be ready to sail shortly; and I will take care to instruct Mr. Fulton to embark and bring up the men, agreeably to the details you have transmitted, or any alteration you may devise.
I seriously hope that further reinforcements will arrive to enable us to go to the northward as early as possible next year. But I much doubt whether it will be advisable to proceed until the main body is assembled, for reasons which I will explain when I have the pleasure of seeing you.
- No. 23,-
EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from Lord Stanley to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
Downing-street, 4 February 1842.
No. 23.
I ASSUME, that the operations of 1841 will have been limited to the successful Lord Stanley to the attack upon Amoy, the occupation of Kulungsu, and the re-occupation of the Lords Commis Island of Chusan.
sioners of the 4 February 1842. Admiralty,
I assume, that the forces available for 1842 will be an army of 9,000 to 10,000 men, of which there will be five British regiments, amounting to about 4,000 men, and a company of British Artillery, combined with a naval force of three ships of the line, and a fleet, including thirteen or fourteen steamers, of about forty sail.
It will, of course, be necessary to provide for the maintenance of Hong-Kong, of the Island of Kulungsu, and of Chusan. The remainder of the force, naval and military, will be available for such operations as it may be deemed most advisable to undertake, with a view of producing such an impression on the court of Pekin, as to lead to a speedy compliance with the terms which Sir Henry Pottinger is instructed to require.
-No. 24.-
COPY of a LETTER from the Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough to Lord Stanley. (Received 5th May.) My Lord,
Fort William, 18 March 1842.
No. 24. IMMEDIATELY after my arrival at this Presidency, I judged it necessary to Lord Ellenborough address letters to the Commander-in-Chief of the land and sea forces of Her to Lord Stanley, Majesty in China, detailing for their Excellencies' information, the extent of the 18 March 1842. military and naval strength to be placed at their disposal for the campaign of the year 1842, and explaining the measures taken by the Government of India for sending further reinforcements of native troops to China. In these letters, copies of which are enclosed, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, I have communicated to the Military and Naval Commanders-in-Chief the manner in which the forces under their command are to be employed.
It occurred to me as not impossible that no instructions will have been sent from China to Singapore to the address of Lord Saltoun, commanding the rein- forcements on their way from England, to await his Lordship's arrival at that port, and I have therefore addressed a letter to that officer, a copy of which
596.
D 4
is
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